Energy as an east Mediterranean opportunity and challenge by Antonia Dimou













The East Mediterranean’s gas resources can 
promote cooperation, resolve conflicts and 
deliver financial benefits contributing to the 
economic development of Israel, Greece and 
Cyprus, advance the energy security of Jordan 
and Turkey, and present new prospects for 
Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians.  
 
                     
1 Antonia Dimou is Diplomatic Advisor at the Hellenic 
Parliament and Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies, 
University of Jordan; and, the Center for Middle East 
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(cbm) in the first three years4, has not yet 
materialized. Israel is deprived of an outlet for 
its gas through the Egyptian under-used LNG 
export facilities in Idku operated by BG Group 
and Damietta by Union Fenosa Gas to process 
Israeli gas to Europe and other lucrative 
markets in Asia.  
The only secured export agreement is the Gas 
Sales and Purchase Agreement (GSPA) signed 
between Noble Energy Inc and Jordan’s 
National Electric Power Corporation (NEPCO) 
for the supply from the Leviathan gas field of 
approximately 1.6 trillion cubic feet (tcf) over a 
15-year period for electricity production5.   
Out of all export options, the construction of a 
pipeline that connects Israeli Leviathan gas field 
to the Turkish coast remains financially 
attractive despite Israeli reservations over the 
likelihood of tying its gas into a single market 
where there is considerable competition. For 
the gas pipeline project to proceed, it has to 
overcome the longstanding Cyprus conflict as 
the pipeline requires crossing Cyprus’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  
The Leviathan gas field’s development whose 9 
bcm gas surplus is destined for export is to be 
carried out in two stages: the first lies in four 
development wells and an annual capacity 
 
4 2016 East Med Forecast: Geopolitics to Rule Gas Deals, 
Energy Press (Greek Energy News Portal), 8th January 
2016. 
5 Noble Energy Executes Leviathan Gas Sales Contract With 
the National Electric Power Company of Jordan, Press 











































                    
production of 12 billion cubic meters (Bcm), and 
the second stage lies in four additional wells 
and an increase of the capacity production by 
another 9 bcm. Nevertheless, uncertainly 
prevails over progress on the basis that even 
secured GSPAs to supply gas from the 
Leviathan field to domestic buyers such as IPM 
Beer Tuvia Ltd are subject to regulatory 
approval6.  
Israel’s energy policies should focus on the 
strengthening of relations between Tel Aviv and 
Nicosia in parallel to any Israeli collaboration 
with Ankaraso that an agreement on joint 
monetization of export-oriented gas resources 
is favored; regional energy cooperation through 
increased energy security, and incentivizing 
American oil and gas companies to proceed 
with investment in exploration activities and 
production commitments in Israel; and, look into 
multiple gas export options so that Israeli gas is 
not tied to a single market where changing 
bilateral relations or geopolitical conditions can 
affect the sustainability of exports and thus 
impact negatively the country’s energy wealth.. 
SYRIA: Redefining The Regional Energy Map’s Centre of 
Gravity  
Geopolitics of energy dominate the crisis in 
Syria. Foreign powers battle control of natural 
gas resources and the trade routes that bring 
energy to consumers. Russia seeks to maintain 
investments in the energy sector in so-called 
“Safe Syria,” which is a promising zone of 
natural gas reserves in the territorial waters off 
 
6 Noble Energy Receives Plan of Development Approval for 
Leviathan Field Offshore Israel, Nasdaq (Global NewsWire), 





































                    
Syria’s Mediterranean coast. The significance 
that Russia attributes to joining the Eastern 
Mediterranean energy game is underlined by 
the fact that energy giant Gazprom has 
reportedly taken over the gas exploration and 
drilling rights off the Syrian coast from Russian 
state-controlled Soyuzneftegaz, which in 2014 
signed a 25-year agreement with the Syrian 
government that concedes exclusive 
exploration rights in Syria’s EEZ7.  
Syria contains a number of gas fields that have 
been periodically seized since 2014 by the 
Islamic State, principally in Palmyra, a city that 
serves as transit for pipelines carrying gas from 
fields in Hasakah and Deir Ezzor provinces in 
northeastern and eastern Syria respectively8. 
ISIS focus around the area of Palmyra is 
attributed to the fact that the city is the hub 
between the transfer of the entire Syrian gas 
production and the power plants that supply 
electricity and gas to most parts of Syria. The 
regime’s control of Shaer field (the largest field 
northwest of Palmyra that feeds the national 
grid) is considered significant because it 
impedes the Islamic State from amassing 
further disproportionate rewards compared to 
its limited investment of combat manpower.  
But as ISIS territory shrinks it seeks to 
substitute traditional sources of revenue like 
transit tolls and wage taxes with financial profits 
deriving from the sale of oil and gas. Upon this 
 
7  Antonia Dimou, “Lebanon and Syria: Stuck between a rock 
and a hard place on natural gas”, Modern Diplomacy, 12th 
January 2017. 
8 Suleiman Al Khalidi, “Islamic State Militants Capture 









































                    
strategy, the terrorist organization allegedly 
sells energy to the Syrian government to power 




Figure 2: Transition route9 
Qatar’s energy agenda in Syria needs to be 
highlighted as it includes a pipeline that would 
connect Qatar and Turkey through Syria, in 
order to join the Nabucco pipeline and 
ultimately reach Europe. For its part, Iran’s 
energy strategy in Syria centers on the Iran-
Iraq-Syria Islamic pipeline project, originally 
signed in 2011. The project is intended to 
transport Iranian gas through the Gulf to Iraq, 
 




































  then to Syrian and Lebanese ports, with Europe 
as the final destination. 
Notably, Russia’s decision to enter the Syrian 
conflict has an aspect linked to the control of 
the country’s energy supply routes. It is 
acknowledged by regional energy experts that 
the eight Russian military bases which have 
been developed over the last year across Syria 
are along the oil and gas routes with most 
prominent the base of Tartus where Syria’s 
prime export terminal is located. Equally 
important, Russia favors the Shia pipeline that 
would carry oil from Iran through Iraq into Syria 
over the Sunni pipeline that would carry oil from 
Qatar to Turkey via Syria.  
The international community’s policies should 
focus on the resolution of the Syrian conflict as 
a prerequisite for the development of the 
country’s untapped offshore gas resources and 
for attracting foreign investment in the context 
of a regional energy cooperation setting. 
Cyprus in Need Not to Mistake Energy Activity with 
Achievement  
Provided the existence of commercially viable 
hydrocarbon resources, Cyprus is assessed to 
get significant economic benefits in the form of 
job creation, foreign direct investment as well 
as royalties and taxes paid to the state treasury 
by energy suppliers. The island’s recent third 
licensing round for the blocks 6, 8 and 10 within 
its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has 
attracted international energy majors such as 
ENI, Total, Exxon Mobil and Qatar Petroleum 








































                    
and the Israeli Leviathan gas fields10. The 
rationale is to connect gas discoveries in 
Cyprus with Egypt’s by pipeline and re-export 
reserves as liquefied natural gas by utilizing the 
Egyptian Idku and Damietta LNG facilities. 
Evidently, the development of Cypriot gas fields 
necessitates synergies among local and 
international players, users and producers, 
eager to export gas to a broader market. 
The criteria for the evaluation of the third 
licensing round’s applications have lied in the 
technical and financial ability of the energy 
companies; the financial proposal of the 
applicant to obtain a license; applicant’s 
commitment to training of personnel; political 
considerations in having energy majors 
involved in the Cypriot blocks; and, any 
irregularities and lack of responsibility that the 
applicant may have demonstrated under a 
previous license in Cyprus or in any other 
country. 
No doubt that a comprehensive settlement of 
the Cyprus problem should be fortified by the 
implementation of concrete confidence building 
measures (CBMs) such as Track-II diplomacy 
between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
on the future use of the East Mediterranean 
natural gas resources. All this despite the 
conventional practice which says that the 
connection between politics and the 
development of hydrocarbons should be limited. 
Policies should focus on the resolution of the 
Cyprus conflict as prerequisite for cooperation 
over East Mediterranean gas production; the 
 
10 Cyprus Offers Licenses for Three Offshore Blocks, 




creation of an East Mediterranean Energy 
Cooperation Council (EMECC) that will support 
the regional energy industry. Members should 
include governments, energy companies and 
service providers. The council will serve as a 
clearinghouse for ideas and plans for mutually 
beneficial energy developments in the region; 
and, support of the joint monetization of Cypriot 
and Egyptian gas resources on the basis that 
economies of scale reinforce profitability and 



































Figure 3: Offshore Exploration Licenses 
Republic of Cyprus 
GREECE: Pivotal to Regional Gas Development  
Greece has been pivotal to the development of 
Israel’s natural gas with the acquisition of the 
Tanin and Karish fields by facilitating 








































                    
with the revised Israeli regulatory framework. 
Greek private E&P company Energean Oil and 
Gas currently owns 100% and is the Operator 
of the two Israeli gas fields  considered as a 
world class asset with 2,4 trillion cubic feet (tcf) 
of natural gas, contingent reserves, and more 
than 20 million barrels of light oil, contingent 
and perspective reserves11. 
Israel has facilitated Greek energy interests, 
which can help Europe diversify supply of 
energy resources. Energean’s ability to present 
a reliable Field Development Plan (FDP) for 
both fields so that first gas is produced in 2020 
looks promising. The company has emerged as 
a smart investor given it managed to acquire 
two new licenses in Israel and another two in 
Western Greece during the low part of the cycle 
of the upstream industry; it also has a powerful 
shareholder basis such as ship owners, 
petroleum engineers, former officials from the 
financial sector, and the US based fund Third 
Point; a long term off take agreement with BP; 
and, the company is backed by financial 
institutions like the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development.  
Pursuant to the overall strategy of Greece in not 
only penetrating the East Mediterranean energy 
landscape but also in exploiting and developing 
its own gas fields in the Ionian Sea and South 
of Crete, the Greek Ministry of Energy is ready 
to sign a contract with French Total’s JV with 
Edison and Hellenic Petroleum for offshore 
 
11 Report: Energean Picks Floating Solution for Tanin, Karish 
Fields, Offshore Energy Today.com, 11th January 2017. 
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PALESTINE: Seeking a Way Out of The Energy Deadlock 
The Palestinian Gaza Marine gas field, one of 
the first regional discoveries back in 2000 
remains untapped despite its location close to 
the shore. The field’s new operator, the Royal 
Dutch Shell that owns 60%, estimates that its 
development is impeded by low oil and gas 
prices14. For a breakthrough in the field’s $500 
million development, the project’s financial 
support either by the World Bank’s Partnership 
for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund or by American financial institutions 
like the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) can prove vital. The value 
of American financial support in the field’s 
development is two-fold as it can help address 
Palestinian development challenges and 
advance U.S. foreign policy priorities. 
The exploitation of the Gaza marine gas field 
would help generate revenues, offer a domestic 
source for electricity generation and for water 
desalination, and prioritize export to 
neighboring counties like Jordan. Already, in 
implementation of its strategy to diversify 
energy sources of supply, Jordan has signed a 
Letter of Intent (LOI) to import 1.5-1.8 bcm per 
year from the Palestinian field.   
Noteworthy, a pessimistic outlook seems to 
prevail for the development of the Rantis oil 
project in the West Bank due to high political 
risks15. Only one offer was received that did not 
 
14  Hedy Cohen, “Israeli Government to Allow Leviathan Gas 
Sales to Gaza”, Globes (Israel’s Business Arena), 19th 
March 2016. 
15 Mohammad Mustafa, “Palestine’s Oil and Gas Resources: 






































                                            
even meet the technical or financial conditions 
of the tender issued in 2014. To ensure the 
development of the oil project, the Palestinian 
Authority considers the establishment of a 
Palestine Investment Fund-led national 
consortium to attract international operators. 
 
Figure 5: Areas of Operation 
 
LEBANON: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back On 
Natural Gas 
Lebanon’s decision to open a new pre-
qualification round for oil and gas companies 
interested in participating in the first 










































                    
marks a breakthrough after three years of 
political impasse.  
The Lebanese government’s approval of a 
decree stipulating Exploration and Production 
Agreements (EPA)and another decree on the 
delimitation of Lebanon’s territorial sea and 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have aimed to 
pave the way for tendering Lebanon’s offshore 
area.16According to energy experts, both 
decrees create more problems rather than 
provide solutions due to lack of transparency 
that favors avidity and rent-seeking behavior 
among the various sectarian groups that 
dominate the political decision-making process. 
 
Figure 6: Overlap of Israeli and Lebanese 
claims 
 
16 Nazeer Rida, “Lebanese Government Passes Two Oil, 




































  Despite persistent American diplomatic efforts 
discouraging Lebanon and Israel from energy 
exploration in contested waters, Beirut decided 
to initiate a tender process to award licenses, 
which Israel considers its own. A bilateral crisis 
could erupt with Israel if Lebanon proceeds with 
non-consensual economic activity in the 
disputed area; thus openness to dialogue 
between Lebanon and Israel is critical when it 
comes to the northern limit of Israel’s Territorial 
Sea and EEZ in accordance with the 
International Maritime Law.  
Challenges that could undermine the 
development of Lebanon’s gas potential lie in 
the lack of strong governance. The country’s 
domestic politics is overwhelmed by constant 
conflicts over the distribution of political power; 
the absence of an anti-corruption framework, 
and lack of free, non-discriminatory competition. 
Often, weak institutional and administrative 
frameworks in Lebanon guarantee a gap 
between declared government plans and 
ultimate delivery. No doubt that the 
development of potential discoveries could help 
Lebanon reduce its domestic energy-deficiency 
and dependence on oil imports if an 
exploration, production and monetization model 
based on best-practice standards and technical 
expertise materializes.  
Policies should focus on the establishment of 
anti-corruption mechanisms for the Lebanese 
oil and gas industry, such as the creation of 
sovereign wealth funds that take part of the gas 
profits and allocate them to the development of 
infrastructure projects; and, encouragement of 
sound institution-building to promote 
transparency by disclosing to the public all 








































                    
including licenses, contracts, and production 
and revenue data. 
 
Egypt and Turkey Share Common Regional Gas 
Ambitions  
Situated right off of the Egyptian coast, Zohr 
field is possibly the largest gas field in the 
world, with an estimated 30 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas. The development of the Zohr gas 
field expected to produce 20-30 bcm annually 
for 20 years will primarily serve the Egyptian 
domestic market, making up for a rapid decline 
in production which has left Cairo increasingly 
struggling to meet its domestic demand17. 
Concurrently, it will free up much needed funds 
for other sectors of the economy, such as 
health and education.  
The impact of the Zohr gas field could well go 
beyond Egypt’s boundaries, due to its location 
and infrastructure given that it is close to 
Cypriot Aphrodite and Israeli Leviathan gas 
fields, thus allowing the development of the 
fields to be coordinated, and the economies of 
scale needed to put in place a competitive 
regional gas export infrastructure. Cooperative 
scenarios foresee gas imports from Cyprus and 
Israel to Egypt with the aim of being exported 
as LNG to Europe and Asia; despite domestic 
controversy, Egyptian companies have 
conducted talks to import gas from Israel, and 
the Egyptian government signed a 
 
17 Anders Norlen and Kerri Maddock, “Giant Gas Field 
Discovery in Egypt Likely to Impact Global Gas Markets”, 





































                    
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 
Cyprus to import gas from Aphrodite field. 
New discoveries guarantee that in the long-term 
Egypt’s production will reach levels of self-
sufficiency; it is in this context that British 
Petroleum (BP), a heavy foreign investor in 
Egyptian fields, recently completed a number of 
transport and processing agreements 
accelerating the development of the Atoll field 
which contains an estimated 1.5 trillion cubic 
feet of gas18; announced the construction of a 
natural gas processing plant in Rosetta 
(Rashid) city, with a capacity ranging from 600-
700million cubic feet per day; and, publicized 
the discovery of a new natural gas field in the 
BaltimSouth Development Lease in the East 
Nile Delta, 12 kilometres from the shoreline. 
 
Figure 7: Areas of Operation 
 
18 BP Steps Forwardwith Atoll Gas Discovery Development, 








































Additionally, the Suez-Med Pipeline and the 
Suez Canal’s extension can be viewed as 
motivators of Egypt’s prioritization of gas 
production. These projects provide preferential 
economic zones; special arbitration and 
policies, such as restoration of corporate funds 
spent in Research & Development; and 
provision of government loans in local currency 
with low interest rates. However, regulatory 
changes in the rest of the country that could 
turn Egypt’s gas sector into a must-be place for 
both suppliers and investors are slow, 
especially when it comes to regulating gas 
prices and trading services. 
Equally interesting are Turkey’s ambitions to 
become a major Eurasian energy hub. The 
concept of creating a regional trading hub in 
proximity to the East Mediterranean, the Middle 
East, and Europe with Turkey at the epicentre 
gains significant ground on the basis of viewing 
natural gas as a shared economic benefit in the 
form of transit fees, new refineries and trading 
facilities. It is estimated that despite the 
Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, the East 
Mediterranean gas is trapped given that global 
low gas prices make less feasible the 
development of regional fields and the 
construction of pipelines. At the same time, the 
presence of cheap Russian gas and the 
discovery of new resources in Africa and the 
US make the East Mediterranean gas less 
attractive. To overcome these hurdles, East 
Mediterranean gas could be shipped to Turkey 
viewed by many energy experts as trading hub. 
Existing gas pipelines in Turkey guarantee the 
presence of qualified technical labour force 
capable to maintain and repair energy 




































  producers and consumers makes the country 
attractive to East Mediterranean neighbours. 
Epilogue 
Gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean 
have the potential to transform the energy 
outlook of individual countries, as well as foster 
regional energy cooperation. This is a period of 
disruption with financial upheavals and political 
instability, hence new opportunities emerge for 
those who are bold and ready to work. Regional 
countries need to identify to this group. 
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